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A recent literature pioneered by Du¢ e, G￿rleanu and Pedersen (2005) (DGP hereafter) uses
search theory to model the trading frictions characteristic of over-the-counter (OTC) markets.1
The search-based approach is appealing because it can parsimoniously rationalize standard
measures of liquidity such as bid-ask spreads, execution delays and trade volume, and can be
used to study how market conditions in￿ uence these measures. A virtue of DGP￿ s formulation
is that it is analytically tractable, so all these mechanisms can be well understood.
The literature spurred by DGP, however, keeps the framework tractable by imposing a
stark restriction on asset holdings, namely, that agents can only hold either 0 or 1 unit of the
asset. In e⁄ect, the investors￿ability to respond to changes in market conditions is limited
rather severely by this restriction. In this paper we develop a search-based model of liquidity in
asset markets with no restrictions on investors￿asset holdings. The model is close in structure
and spirit to DGP, but captures the heterogeneous responses of individual investors to changes
in market conditions. From the broader perspective of search and matching theory, a striking
feature of the model we develop is that it remains analytically tractable despite the large degree
of heterogeneity among agents which is propagated endogenously by random matching with
unrestricted asset holdings.2 We provide a full characterization of the equilibrium￿ including
transitional dynamics and the endogenous distribution of investors￿asset positions￿ and show
how it depends on all the details of the market structure.
Our methodological contribution provides new insights into how trading frictions a⁄ect
outcomes in ￿nancial markets. We ￿nd that as a result of the restrictions they impose on asset
holdings, existing search-based theories neglect a critical feature of illiquid markets, namely the
fact that market participants can mitigate trading frictions by adjusting their asset positions to
reduce their trading needs.3 The key theoretical observation is that an investor￿ s asset demand
1The search-theoretic literature on ￿nancial markets also includes Du¢ e, G￿rleanu and Pedersen (2006),
G￿rleanu (2006), Miao (2006), Rust and Hall (2003), Spulber (1996) and Weill (2007).
2DGP restricted asset holdings for the same technical reasons why Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) restricted
money holdings to f0;1g, i.e., to keep the endogenous distribution of asset holdings manageable. Aside from a
few exceptions, such as Green and Zhou (2002), the recent monetary literature, e.g., Lagos and Wright (2005),
allows for unrestricted portfolios and keeps the analysis tractable by making assumptions that render the equi-
librium distribution of money holdings degenerate. By way of comparison, the model we develop here allows for
unrestricted asset holdings and remains tractable even though we make no attempt to harness the heterogeneity
that is generated by the model dynamics.
3The importance of this mechanism in the context of another class of models￿ those with exogenous trans-
action costs￿ has been stressed by Constantinides (1986) for the case of proportional transaction costs, and by
Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2004) for the case of ￿xed transaction costs.
2in an OTC market depends not only on his valuation for the asset at the time of the trade,
but also on his expected valuation over the holding period until his next opportunity to trade.
A reduction in trading delays makes investors less likely to remain locked into an undesirable
asset position and therefore induces them to put more weight on their current valuation. As a
result, reductions in trading frictions induce an investor to demand a larger asset position if his
current valuation is relatively high, and a smaller position if it is relatively low. We ￿nd that
these responses of individual asset demands are a key determinant of market e¢ ciency and asset
prices as well as bid-ask spreads, trade volume and trading delays￿ precisely the dimensions of
market liquidity that search-based theories of ￿nancial intermediation are designed to explain.
From an investor￿ s standpoint, bid-ask spreads constitute the main out-of-pocket transaction
cost in an illiquid market. We show that spreads depend not only on the ease with which
investors can ￿nd alternative trading partners (a mechanism identi￿ed in the existing literature),
but also on the degree of mismatch between investors￿endogenous asset positions and their
current valuations of the asset. Our model predicts a distribution of transaction costs, both
across trade sizes￿ with spreads that increase with the size of the trade￿ as well as within a
given trade-size category￿ across investors with di⁄erent valuations.
Trade volume is a manifestation of the ability of the exchange mechanism to reallocate assets
across investors. We ￿nd that a reduction in trading delays shifts the equilibrium distribution
of asset holdings in a way that tends to increase trade volume. Our theory reveals that from an
investor￿ s point of view, an increase in the market power of dealers is isomorphic to an increase
in trading delays. Hence, trade volume will tend to be small in markets where dealers enjoy a
large degree of market power. These e⁄ects are implicitly assumed away if asset holdings are
restricted to lie in f0;1g.
Finally, we allow for free entry of dealers as a way to endogenize trading delays￿ a distin-
guishing feature of the microstructure of an OTC market. We ￿nd that when interacted with
investors￿unrestricted asset holding decisions, the dealers￿incentives to make markets generate
a liquidity externality that can give rise to multiple steady states. This ￿nding suggests that
all the symptoms of an illiquid market￿ large spreads, small trade volume and long trading
delays￿ can simultaneously arise as a self-ful￿lling phenomenon in asset markets with an OTC
structure.
32 Environment
Time is continuous, starts at t = 0 and goes on forever. There are two types of in￿nitely-lived
agents: a unit measure of investors and a unit measure of dealers. There is one asset, one
perishable consumption good called fruit, and another consumption good de￿ned as numØraire.
The asset is durable, perfectly divisible and in ￿xed supply, A 2 R+. Each unit of the asset
produces a unit ￿ ow of fruit. There is no market for fruit, so holding the asset is necessary
to consume this good. The numØraire good is produced and consumed by all agents. The
instantaneous utility function of an investor is ui(a) + c, where a 2 R+ represents the fruit
consumption (which coincides with the investor￿ s asset holdings), c 2 R is the net consumption
of the numØraire good (c < 0 if the investor produces more of these goods than he consumes),
and i 2 X = f1;:::;Ig indexes a preference type. The utility function ui(a) is twice continuously
di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.4 Each investor receives a preference
shock with Poisson arrival rate ￿. This process is independent across investors. Conditional
on the preference shock, the probability the investor draws preference type i is ￿i > 0, with
PI
i=1 ￿i = 1. These preference shocks capture the notion that investors will value the asset
di⁄erently over time thereby generating the need to rebalance their asset positions.5 Dealers
do not hold positions and their instantaneous utility is c, their consumption of the numØraire
good.6 All agents discount at rate r > 0.
Dealers can trade the asset continuously in a competitive interdealer market. Investors
periodically contact dealers who can trade in this market on their behalf. Meetings with dealers
occur at random according to a Poisson process with arrival rate ￿.7 Once a dealer and an
4Just as in DGP, our speci￿cation associates a certain utility to the investor as a function of his asset holdings.
The utility from holding an asset position could be simply the value from enjoying the asset itself, as would be
the case for real assets such as cars or houses. An alternative interpretation that leads to the same formulation
would be to assume that there is a single consumption good, that investors are risk-neutral and able to borrow
and lend freely at rate r, and regard the asset as physical capital used to produce the consumption good with
the production technology ui. As yet another possibility, one could adopt the preferred interpretation of DGP,
namely that ui is in fact a reduced-form utility function that stands in for the various reasons why investors may
want to hold di⁄erent quantities of the asset, such as di⁄erences in liquidity needs, ￿nancing or ￿nancial-distress
costs, correlation of asset returns with endowments (hedging needs), or relative tax disadvantages. By now,
several papers that build on the work of DGP have formalized the ￿hedging needs￿interpretation. Examples
include Du¢ e, G￿rleanu and Pedersen (2006), G￿rleanu (2006) and Vayanos and Weill (2008).
5In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (Appendix B) we allow preference shocks to follow a general continuous-time
Markov chain and ￿nd that most of the substantive results generalize under appropriate regularity conditions.
6The restriction that dealers cannot hold assets is immaterial when analyzing steady-state equilibria. Lagos,
Rocheteau and Weill (2007) study dynamic equilibria where dealers may choose to hold asset positions.
7While our description of the trading process is stylized, it captures the salient features of the actual trading
arrangements in OTC markets. We refer the interested reader to Schultz (2001) as well as the discussion in
4investor have contacted each other they negotiate over the quantity of assets that the dealer
will acquire for the investor and the intermediation fee that the dealer charges for his services.
After the transaction has been completed, the dealer and the investor part ways.
Asset holdings and preference types lie in the sets R+ and X, respectively, and vary across
investors and over time. We describe this heterogeneity with a probability space (S;￿;Ht),
where S = R+ ￿ X, ￿ is the ￿-￿eld generated by the sets (A;I), where A ￿ R+ and I ￿ X,
and Ht is a probability measure on ￿ which represents the distribution of investors across asset
holdings and preference types at time t.
3 Equilibrium
Let Vi (a;t) denote the maximum expected discounted utility attainable by an investor who has





+ e￿r(T￿￿t)fVk(T￿)[ak(T￿)(T￿);T￿] ￿ p(T￿)[ak(T￿)(T￿) ￿ a] ￿ ￿k(T￿)(a;T￿)g
￿
; (1)
where T￿ denotes the next time the investor contacts a dealer and k(s) 2 X the investor￿ s
preference type at time s. The expectations operator, Ei, is over the random variables T￿ and
k(s) and is indexed by i to indicate that it is conditional on k(t) = i. The ￿rst term on the
right side of (1) contains the expected discounted utility ￿ ows over the time interval [t;T￿],
whose length is exponentially distributed with mean 1=￿. The ￿ ow utility is indexed by the
preference type, k(s), which follows a compound Poisson process. The second term on the right
side of (1) is the expected discounted utility from the time when the investor next contacts a
dealer, T￿, onwards. At this time T￿, the dealer purchases ak(T￿)(T￿) ￿ a in the market (or
sells if this quantity is negative) at price p(T￿) on behalf of the investor; the investor readjusts
his asset holdings from a to ak(T￿)(T￿) and pays the dealer an intermediation fee ￿k(T￿)(a;T￿).
Both the fee and the asset price are expressed in terms of the numØraire good.8
Section 2.1 in Lagos and Rocheteau (2006).
8Since the intermediation fee is determined in a bilateral meeting, it may depend on the investor￿ s preference
type and asset holdings. Our notation for the investor￿ s new asset position, ak(T￿)(T￿), makes explicit that it
may depend on time and on the investor￿ s preference type at the time of the trade. Below (condition (3)), we
will ￿nd that the investor￿ s new asset position is independent of the asset position he was holding at the time
of the trade. To simplify the notation we anticipate this result and do not include a as an argument of his new
asset position.
5Let W (t) denote the maximum expected discounted utility attainable by a dealer. It satis￿es








where the expectations operator, E, is over the next time the dealer meets an investor, T￿.
Random matching implies that the investor whom the dealer meets is a random draw from
HT￿, the distribution of investors across preference types and asset holdings at time T￿.
We turn to the determination of the terms of trade in a bilateral meeting at time t between
a dealer and an investor of type i who is holding a. Let a0 denote the investor￿ s post-trade
asset holdings and ￿ the intermediation fee. We take (a0;￿) to be the outcome corresponding
to the Nash solution to a bargaining problem where the dealer has bargaining power ￿ 2 [0;1].
The utility of the investor is Vi(a0;t) ￿ p(t)(a0 ￿ a) ￿ ￿ if an agreement (a0;￿) is reached, and
Vi(a;t) in case of disagreement. Therefore, the investor￿ s gain from trade is Vi(a0;t)￿Vi(a;t)￿
p(t)(a0 ￿ a) ￿ ￿. Analogously, the utility of the dealer is W (t) + ￿ if an agreement (a0;￿) is
reached and W (t) in case of disagreement, so the dealer￿ s gain from trade is the fee, ￿. The
bargaining outcome is
[ai(t);￿i(a;t)] = arg max
(a0;￿)
[Vi(a0;t) ￿ Vi(a;t) ￿ p(t)(a0 ￿ a) ￿ ￿]1￿￿￿￿; (2)
where the maximization is subject to a0 ￿ 0.9 The solution (2) can be written as





￿i (a;t) = ￿ fVi [ai (t);t] ￿ Vi(a;t) ￿ p(t)[ai (t) ￿ a]g: (4)





+ e￿r(T￿￿t)f(1 ￿ ￿)max
a0￿0
￿





It is apparent from (5) that the investor￿ s payo⁄ is the same he would get in an alternative
environment where he meets dealers according to a Poisson process with arrival rate ￿, but
9It would be equivalent to set ￿ = (^ p￿p(t))(a
0￿a) in (2) and reformulate the bargaining problem as a choice
of (a
0 ￿ a; ^ p). If a
0 > a the investor is a buyer and ^ p > p(t) can be interpreted as the ask price he is charged by
the dealer. Conversely, if a
0 < a the investor is a seller and ^ p < p(t) is the bid price he is paid by the dealer. In
Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (Appendix C), we formulate several strategic bargaining games, each with a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that coincides with the axiomatic Nash solution we have adopted here.
6instead of bargaining, he readjusts his asset position and extracts the whole surplus with prob-
ability 1￿￿, whereas with probability ￿ he cannot readjust his asset position and enjoys no gain
from trade. Therefore, from the standpoint of the investor, keeping the paths of the aggregate
variables unchanged, the environment we are analyzing is payo⁄-equivalent to an alternative
one in which he meets dealers according to a Poisson process with arrival rate ￿ = ￿(1￿￿) and
has all the bargaining power in bilateral negotiations. Based on this observation, the following
lemma o⁄ers an equivalent formulation of the investor￿ s choice of asset holdings that appears
on the right side of (5).
Lemma 1 An investor with preference type i and asset holdings a who readjusts his asset








(r + ￿)ui(a) + ￿
P
j ￿juj(a)
r + ￿ + ￿
(7)








In Lemma 1, ￿ ui(a)=(r + ￿) is the expected discounted utility and q (t)=(r + ￿) = p(t) ￿
E[e￿r(T￿￿t)p(T￿)] the present value of the expected capital loss to the investor from holding
a from t until the next (e⁄ective) time T￿ when he readjusts his holdings, where T￿ ￿ t is
exponentially distributed with mean 1=￿. A choice of asset holdings, ai (t), must satisfy
￿ u0
i [ai(t)] ￿ q(t), ￿ = ￿ if ai(t) > 0. (9)
Given q (t), the following lemma shows how to recover p(t).10











At this point we can simplify the expression for the intermediation fee. From (4), ￿i(a;t) =
￿ fVi [ai(t);t] ￿ Vi(a;t) ￿ p(t)[ai(t) ￿ a]g, with ai(t) characterized by (9). If we substitute the
value functions (e.g., (27) from the appendix) we arrive at
￿i(a;t) =
￿ f￿ ui [ai(t)] ￿ ￿ ui (a) ￿ q(t)[ai(t) ￿ a]g
r + ￿
: (11)
10In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (Appendix D) we show that p(t) must satisfy limt!1 e
￿rtp(t) = 0 in any
equilibrium, so we can appeal to this condition without loss of generality.
7Since each investor contacts a dealer with equal probability, the quantity of assets supplied
in the interdealer market over a small interval of time dt is ￿dtA.11 Similarly, the measure of
type-i investors who contact dealers is ￿dtni(t), where
ni(t) = e￿￿tni(0) + (1 ￿ e￿￿t)￿i (12)
is the measure of investors with preference type i at time t, so the demand for assets in the
interdealer market is ￿dt
PI
i=1 ni(t)ai(t). The clearing condition for the asset market is
I X
i=1
ni(t)ai(t) = A: (13)
At any point in time investors di⁄er in asset holdings and preference types. Consider a set
of asset holdings A and a set of preference types I, then for all (A;I) 2 ￿, Ht (A;I) gives the
measure of investors whose asset holdings and preference types lie in A and I, respectively. We
characterize this probability measure in the following lemma, where Ifa2Ag denotes an indicator
function that equals 1 if a 2 A.






























nj(t ￿ ￿): (16)
At time 0, the market starts with investors distributed across preference types and asset holdings
according to the initial probability measure H0. Subsequently there are two types of investors,
those who have not contacted a dealer since time 0 and those who have. The time-t measure
of those who started at time 0 with preference type j and assets in A, whose preference type
is i at the current time t, and who have never traded (so their asset holdings are still in A)
is n0
ji(A;t) as given in (15). Analogously, nji (￿;t) in (16) gives the time-t density of investors
11See Du¢ e and Sun (2007) for a derivation of the Law of Large Numbers in random-matching environments.
8whose last trade was at time t ￿ ￿ when their preference type was j and who have preference
type i at time t.
We are now ready to de￿ne equilibrium.
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium is a time-path hfai(t)g;q(t);p(t);f￿i(a;t)g;Hti that satis￿es (9),
(10), (11), (13) and (14), given an initial condition H0.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium.
To illustrate how a reduction in trading delays a⁄ects the equilibrium, consider the limiting
case ￿ ! 1. From (7), ￿ ui(a) ! ui(a) and from (8) and (9), u0
i [ai (t)] ￿ q(t) = rp(t) ￿ _ p(t)




i [q￿(t)] = A, where I+
t =
fi 2 X : ai (t) > 0g. From (11), ￿i(a;t) ! 0 for all a, i and t. With regards to the distribution
of investors, ￿ ! 1 implies that every investor holds his desired asset position at all times.12
Thus, as frictions vanish, investors choose ai (t) continuously by equating their current marginal
utility from holding the asset to its e⁄ective cost q￿ (t), and the equilibrium fees, asset price
and distribution of asset holdings are the ones that would prevail in a Walrasian economy.
3.1 E¢ ciency
Consider a social planner who wishes to maximize the sum of all agents￿expected discounted
utilities, subject to the same meeting frictions that they face in the decentralized formulation.
Speci￿cally, over a small time interval of length dt the planner can only reallocate assets among
a measure ￿dt of investors chosen at random from the population.
Since the utility of consumption and the disutility of production of the numØraire good net















￿ni(t)ai(t) ￿ ￿A, (17)
12To see this, ￿rst note that (15) implies the measure of agents who have not contacted a dealer since time 0
vanishes; i.e., n
0
ji(A;t) ! 0 for all i and j, all t and all A ￿ R+ as ￿ ! 1. The time-t density of agents who have
not contacted a dealer since time t ￿ ￿ > 0 is n(￿;t) =
PI
i;j=1 nji (￿;t). From (16), ￿ ! 1 implies n(￿;t) ! 0
for all ￿ > 0, i.e., investors can ￿nd a dealer instantly when ￿ is arbitrarily large, so the measure of investors who
have not met a dealer between t￿￿ and t is zero for all ￿ > 0. As for those investors who have met a dealer this
￿instant,￿from (16), nji (0;t) = 0 for i 6= j and nii (0;t) = ni (t). Therefore, Ht (A;I) !
P
i2I Ifai(t)2Agni(t)
as ￿ ! 1, i.e., every investor of type i holds ai (t) at every t.
9(12), and ai (t) ￿ 0 for i 2 X, where









^ Ui(a)dH0, and H0 is given. The constant K0 captures the utility of all investors before
they trade for the ￿rst time. The second term in the objective states that over a time interval
of length dt there is a measure ￿ni(t)dt of investors of type i whose asset holdings can be
rebalanced.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium is e¢ cient if and only if ￿ = 0.
When an investor conducts a trade, he anticipates that the fee he will be charged to rebalance
his asset holdings in his next encounter with a dealer will be increasing in the gains from that
future trade. Hence, ￿ > 0 ine¢ ciently discourages investors from taking positions that tend
to lead to large asset reallocations in the future.
3.2 Steady state
Next, we characterize the limit of the equilibrium allocations and prices as t ! 1.13
Proposition 3 For any H0, the equilibrium allocations and prices described in De￿nition
1, hfai(t)g;q(t);p(t);f￿i(a;t)g;Hti, converge to the unique steady-state allocations and prices
hfaig;q;p;f￿i(a)g;Hi, that satisfy p = q=r,
￿ u0
i (ai) ￿ q ￿ = ￿ if ai > 0; (18)
I X
i=1
￿iai = A; (19)
￿i(a) =







and H (A;I) = 0 for all (A;I) 2 ￿ such that
I S
j=1
fajg \ A = ?.
In what follows, when we analyze the steady state we will denote an individual investor￿ s state
(ai;j) 2 faigI
i=1 ￿X by (i;j) 2 X2 and H(faig;fjg) by nij. Also, at times we use ￿ji to denote
￿i (aj) for (i;j) 2 X2.
13We omit the ￿t￿argument in an endogenous variable when we refer to its steady-state value.
104 Asset holdings, prices and trade volume
In this section we focus on the steady state to study the e⁄ects of trading frictions on individual
asset holdings, asset prices and trade volume. Hereafter we assume u0
i (1) = 0 and u0
i (0) = 1
for each i.14 Condition (18) becomes
￿ u0
i(ai) = rp. (22)













i (ai)(r + ￿ + ￿)
2 (23)




j (ai), i.e., an investor whose current marginal valuation exceeds
his expected marginal valuation over the expected holding period increases his demand when








j (ai) in the future, and that when this happens, he may be unable to
rebalance his asset position for some time. Consequently, from (22), his choice of ai is lower
than u0￿1
i (rp), what he would choose in a world with no trading delays. If ￿ increases, the
investor is more likely to ￿nd a dealer faster; if ￿ decreases, it will be cheaper for the investor
to readjust his asset holdings once he ￿nds a dealer. In both cases the investor assigns more
weight to current marginal utility from holding the asset relative to the expected value, so his
demand increases. Conversely, an investor with a current marginal valuation which is below his
expected marginal valuation over the holding period reduces his demand when ￿ increases.15
Next, we show how these reallocation e⁄ects shape the implications of trading frictions for asset
prices and trade volume.
Standard frictionless models emphasize two sets of factors that a⁄ect the determination of
equilibrium asset prices, i.e., intrinsic properties of the asset and the characteristics of investors
14These conditions imply that the investor￿ s problem has a solution for all q > 0, and that the nonnegativity
constraints in (6) are slack at every date for every investor in the unique equilibrium. This will simplify the
notation but is otherwise inessential for our results. See Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) for utility speci￿cations
that do not satisfy the Inada conditions.
15In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (Appendix B) we show that this insight does not rely on preference shocks
being i.i.d. We derive an expression analogous to (23) when preference shocks follow a general Markov process
and provide several su¢ cient conditions that allow us to sign @gi(￿;p)=@￿. We show, for instance, that for ￿






j(ai), where ￿ij is the probability that an
investor with preference type i draws type j conditional on his receiving a preference shock. This condition is
equivalent to the condition in part (i) of Proposition 2 in G￿rleanu (2006). See Proposition 10 in Lagos and
Rocheteau (2008) for details.
11who buy it. Search theory identi￿es a third element: the manner in which the asset is traded,
i.e., the details of the micro structure of the asset market, such as the rate at which investors
contact dealers and the market power of dealers. The following proposition characterizes the
e⁄ects of these trading frictions on asset prices.
Proposition 4 Let ui(a) = "iu(a). If [u0(a)]
2 =u00(a) is strictly decreasing in a, then dp=d￿ > 0.
If [u0(a)]
2 =u00(a) is increasing in a, then dp=d￿ ￿ 0 (with ￿=￿if [u0(a)]
2 =u00(a) is constant).
For the class of preferences in Proposition 4, ￿ ui (a) = ￿ "iu(a), where ￿ "i =
(r+￿)"i+￿￿ "
r+￿+￿ and ￿ " =
PI
j=1 ￿j"j, and (22) becomes ￿ "iu0(ai) = rp. For a given p, the demands of investors with
relatively low valuations ("i < ￿ ") fall, while those of investors with high valuations ("i > ￿ ")
rise as ￿ increases. Whether an increase in ￿ causes the asset price to rise depends on the
curvature of the individual demand for the asset as a function of ￿ "i, i.e., on the slope of
@ai=@￿ "i = ￿[u0(ai)]
2 =[u00(ai)rp]. If u is not too concave, ai is a convex function of ￿ "i. For
this case, Jensen￿ s inequality implies that the increases in ai for relatively large values of "i
outweigh the decreases in ai for relatively low values of "i and the aggregate demand for the
asset increases in response to an increase in ￿. In turn, this implies that the equilibrium price
of the asset increases with ￿. Conversely, the asset price is decreasing in ￿ if u is su¢ ciently
concave. For example, if u(a) = a1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) with ￿ > 0, then dp=d￿ < 0 (> 0) if ￿ > 1
(< 1).16
It is clear from (23) that regardless of the ultimate e⁄ect of trading frictions on the asset
price, an increase in ￿ induces high-valuation investors to take larger positions and low-valuation
investors to take smaller positions. This seems to suggest that the distribution of asset holdings
will spread out if frictions are reduced. However, this intuition is only partial because (23) keeps
the equilibrium asset price constant. In the following proposition we characterize the general
equilibrium e⁄ect of trading frictions on the dispersion of the distribution of asset holdings.
Proposition 5 (i) Let ui(a) = "ia1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) with ￿ > 0. An increase in ￿ causes the
equilibrium distribution of asset holdings to become riskier, in the second-order stochastic sense.
(ii) For all i 2 f1;::;Ig, ai ! A as r + ￿ ! 0.
16If u(a) = loga, then ai is linear in ￿ "i and dp=d￿ = 0. This particular result is reminiscent of the ￿ndings
in Constantinides (1986), G￿rleanu (2006) and Heaton and Lucas (1996) that the equilibrium asset price is not
(much) a⁄ected by transaction costs. In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (Appendix B) we show that this ￿nding
generalizes to the more general case of Markovian preference shocks.
12Part (i) of Proposition 5 con￿rms that for a particular class of preferences, the distribution
of asset holdings spreads out if frictions are reduced. According to part (ii), the dispersion
of the distribution of asset holdings approaches zero as trading frictions become very severe,
provided that investors are su¢ ciently patient. This result holds for general preferences and
will be useful in our analysis of transaction costs and trade volume.17






nij jaj ￿ aij: (24)
An increase in ￿ has three distinct e⁄ects on V. First, the measure of investors in any individual
state (i;j) 2 X2 who gain access to the market and are able to trade increases, which tends
to increase V. Second, the proportion 1 ￿
PI
i=1nii of agents who are mismatched to their
asset position￿ the fraction of agents who wish to trade￿ decreases, which tends to decrease
V. Finally, the distribution of asset holdings spreads out, which tends to increase the quantity
of assets traded in many individual trades. With (21) and (24), it is possible to show that the
￿rst two e⁄ects combined lead to an increase in V. While it is di¢ cult to sign the third e⁄ect in
general due to the general equilibrium e⁄ects of the price on the distribution of asset holdings,
we provide analytical results for three special cases. First, with I = 2 it is possible to show that
an increase in ￿ unambiguously leads to an increase in V. The second special case allows for
richer heterogeneity in types, but adopts a speci￿cation of preferences for which the equilibrium
asset price is independent of trading frictions. The third case considers the limiting economy
where trading frictions become very severe and investors are patient.
Proposition 6 (i) Let ui(a) = "ia1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) with ￿ > 0, and assume that I = 2. Trade
volume increases with ￿.
(ii) Let ui(a) = "i lna. Trade volume increases with ￿. Moreover, for any pair (￿;￿0) such
that ￿0 > ￿, the distribution of trade sizes associated with ￿0 ￿rst-order stochastically dominates
the one associated with ￿.
17In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (part (iii) of Proposition ??)) we show that part (ii) of Proposition 5 also
holds for more general preference shock processes. The proof of part (i) of Proposition 5 relies on the assumption
of i.i.d. preference shocks and its immediate mean-reverting property. The i.i.d. speci￿cation, however, is without
loss of generality for the case I = 2. (This is the case analyzed by DGP and much of the subsequent literature.)
For I > 2, an increase in trading frictions need not compress the cross-sectional distribution of asset holdings.
As pointed out by G￿rleanu (2006), it is possible that for certain ranges of ￿, an investor with a high current
valuation (relative to the cross-section of current valuations) may increase his asset holdings in response to an
increase in trading frictions. The general insight, however, is that investors always react to more severe trading
frictions by choosing asset positions that reduce the expected sizes of their future asset reallocations.
13(iii) Trade volume approaches zero as r + ￿ ! 0.
5 Transaction costs
Intermediation fees and the implied bid-ask spreads constitute the out-of-pocket transaction
costs borne by investors and are commonly used measures of market liquidity.18 At the same
time, these spreads determine the revenue of dealers, and hence are a key determinant of their
incentives to make markets and provide liquidity, a theme we explore in Section 6.
Intermediation fees depend on the rate at which investors can contact alternative dealers,
on their bargaining power in bilateral negotiations and on the size of the trade. The following
result shows that, keeping the characteristics of an investor and a dealer constant, transaction
costs￿ both total and per unit of asset traded￿ increase with the size of the trade.19









have the same sign as a ￿ ai.
In the general equilibrium, trading frequencies and bargaining power a⁄ect transaction costs
through three channels. Consider for example ￿i (aj), the fee paid by an investor who currently
has preference type i, and whose preference type was j at the time of his last trade. A larger ￿
tends to reduce the fees that dealers can extract for any given trade size (e.g., it increases the
denominator of (20)). Intuitively, a larger ￿ implies better search options for the investor￿
the competition e⁄ect of reduced trading frictions emphasized in the previous literature. But
here an increase in ￿ also changes the investor￿ s expected utility from holding his current asset
position, aj, relative to the expected utility from holding his desired asset position, ai (i.e., it
changes ￿ ui in (20)). This e⁄ect may decrease or increase the intermediation fee depending on the
speci￿c values of aj and ai. Finally, ￿ a⁄ects the actual and desired asset positions, aj and ai,
themselves. A larger ￿ can induce investors to conduct larger asset reallocations (Proposition
18See footnote 9 for the theoretical link between intermediation fees and bid-ask spreads.
19The theory generates a distribution of transaction costs, not only across trade-size categories, but also among
trades of equal size, which is in accordance with the evidence from the OTC market for municipal bonds (Green,
Holli￿eld and Schurho⁄, 2007). The increasing relationship between trade size and transaction cost for given ￿
is consistent with the empirical evidence on foreign exchange markets (Burnside Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski and
Rebelo, 2006, Table 12). In contrast, empirical studies on municipal and corporate bond markets document that
larger trades tend to be executed at a discount (Harris and Piwowar, 2006). Our model can rationalize this
observation if we allow for heterogenous investors, some of which can contact dealers faster than others. See
Lagos and Rocheteau (2006).
146) and by Lemma 4 this translates into larger fees for dealers, on average￿ the reallocation
e⁄ect of reduced trading frictions. These three e⁄ects can give rise to nonmonotonicities in the
dealers￿incentives to make markets in response to changes in the degree of trading frictions.
We prove this result for the case of patient traders, both for intermediation fees for individual
trades (Proposition 7) and for market-wide measures of transaction costs (Corollary 1).
Proposition 7 For each (i;j) 2 X2, there exists ￿ r > 0, such that for all r < ￿ r and ￿ 2 (0;1),
￿ji is non-monotonic in ￿ and it is largest for some ￿ 2 (0;1).
In very illiquid markets (as r + ￿ ! 0) investors hedge against future preference shocks by
choosing asset holdings that re￿ ect their average utility from holding the asset rather than
their current utility at the time they trade. Thus, trade sizes and fees are small. In very
liquid markets (as ￿ ! 1) investors trade large quantities but the fees they pay are also small
because of favorable search options. For intermediate values of ￿, trade sizes are considerable
and dealers have a degree of market power that results in larger intermediation fees.








￿ ui (ai) ￿ ￿ ui (aj)
r + ￿
: (25)
This average fee is the expected revenue of an individual dealer conditional on meeting an
investor, and is therefore a key determinant of the dealers￿incentives to make markets. The
following corollary of Proposition 7 characterizes how trading frictions a⁄ect these incentives,
which will play a key role in the following section.
Corollary 1 There exists ^ r > 0, such that for all r < ^ r and ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿ is non-monotonic in
￿ and it is largest for some ￿ 2 (0;1).
Corollary 1 says that dealers are better o⁄ when they trade in markets which are neither too
liquid nor too illiquid. If ￿ is very large, dealers would ￿nd it pro￿table to shift the trading
activity to markets with larger ￿ or smaller ￿. Conversely if ￿ is very small, perhaps surprisingly,
dealers would bene￿t from reductions in ￿ or increases in ￿.
156 Endogenous execution delays
In this section we allow for free entry of dealers in order to endogenize the supply of liquidity
services and the length of the trading delays. We formalize the notion that a dealer￿ s pro￿t
depends on the competition for order ￿ ow that he faces from other dealers.
Suppose that ￿ is a continuously di⁄erentiable function of the measure of dealers in the mar-
ket, ￿, with @￿(￿)=@￿ > 0 and @ [￿(￿)=￿]=@￿ < 0. We also specify ￿(0) = 0, lim￿!1 ￿(￿) = 1
and lim￿!1 ￿(￿)=￿ = 0. Since all matches are bilateral and random, the Poisson rate at which
a dealer contacts an investor is ￿(￿)=￿. For larger ￿, each investor contacts dealers faster, but
the order ￿ ow decreases for each individual dealer.
There is a large measure of dealers who can choose to participate in the market. Dealers
who choose to operate incur a ￿ ow cost ￿ > 0 that represents the ongoing costs of running the
dealership.20 With (25), the free-entry condition,
￿(￿)







￿ ui (ai) ￿ ￿ ui (aj)
r + ￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
= ￿: (26)
A steady-state equilibrium with free entry is a list hfaig;q;p;f￿i(a)g;fnjig;￿i that satis￿es
(18)￿ (21) and (26), with ￿ = ￿(￿). It can be shown (see Lagos and Rocheteau, 2006) that for
any ￿ > 0 there exists a steady-state equilibrium with free entry of dealers, and it has ￿ > 0.
The steady-state equilibrium with free entry need not be unique. While the measure of
dealers, ￿, is strictly increasing in ￿, according to Corollary 1 the dealers￿expected revenue,
￿, can itself be a non-monotonic function of ￿(￿). On the one hand faster trade means more
competition among dealers, which tends to reduce intermediation fees. But an increase in ￿(￿)
also induces investors to take on more extreme asset positions which means that on average,
dealers will intermediate larger trades and earn higher fees. For the case of patient traders,
the following result shows that the model necessarily exhibits multiple steady-state equilibria
if ￿(￿)=￿ is not too elastic (the e⁄ect of an additional dealer on existing dealers￿order ￿ ow is
not too large) and ￿ is in an intermediate range.
Proposition 8 Assume ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿(￿) = ￿￿, with ￿ 2 (0;1). There exist ~ r > 0, ~ ￿ 2 (0;1),
￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 (0;￿) such that for all (r;￿) 2 (0; ~ r) ￿ (~ ￿;1), there are multiple steady-state
equilibria if ￿ 2 (￿;￿).
20Our formulation of the free entry of dealers is analogous to the free entry of ￿rms in Pissarides (2000).
16In the case of multiple equilibria, the market could be trapped in a low-liquidity equilibrium
where few dealers enter and investors engage in relatively small transactions.21 Regarding the
e¢ ciency properties of equilibrium with entry, investors￿asset holdings are e¢ cient only if
dealers have no bargaining power, just as in the formulation with a ￿xed population of dealers.
Therefore, since there is no equilibrium with ￿ > 0 when ￿ = 0, an equilibrium with entry is
always ine¢ cient.22
7 Conclusion
We have developed a model of trade in asset markets that contributes to a growing literature
that uses search theory to model the trading frictions characteristic of OTC markets. A novel
aspect of our theory is that it does not assume restrictions on asset holdings and therefore allows
market participants to accommodate trading frictions by adjusting their asset positions so as to
reduce their trading needs. We have found that this mechanism has important implications for
market e¢ ciency and the way in which trading frictions shape asset prices as well as standard
measures of ￿nancial liquidity. Although we have emphasized the application to OTC markets
for ￿nancial securities, the structure and solution techniques we have developed should prove
useful for applications of search theory to other contexts where idiosyncratic uncertainty and
random matching give rise to nontrivial distributions of asset holdings.
21The strategic complementarity that leads to multiple equilibria in this model depends crucially on the
endogenous distribution of asset holdings. The multiplicity is not due to increasing returns in the meeting
technology, as in Diamond (1982) or Vayanos and Weill (2008), or to the cost of holding the liquid asset, as in
Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
22As r ! 0, it can be shown that an equilibrium with free-entry is e¢ cient if and only if ￿ = 0 and
￿￿
0(￿)=￿(￿) = ￿. Entry introduces a negative externality on other dealers￿order ￿ ow, and this externality
is internalized if and only if the elasticity of the contact technology ￿(￿) coincides with dealers￿ bargaining
power￿ the so-called Hosios (1990) condition.
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20A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We can rewrite (5) as
Vi(a;t) = ￿ Ui(a) + Ei[e￿r(T￿￿t)fp(T￿)a + max
a0￿0
[Vk(T￿)(a0;T￿) ￿ p(T￿)a0]g]; (27)
where











From (27), the problem of an investor with preference shock i who gains access to the market




￿ Ui(a0) ￿ fp(t) ￿ E[e￿r(T￿￿t)p(T￿)]ga0
i
: (29)





Step (i). Equation (28) can be written recursively as




￿￿ Uj(a) ￿ ￿ Ui(a)
￿
: (30)
(We provide an alternative, more detailed, derivation in Lagos and Rocheteau (2007).) Multiply
(30) through by ￿i, sum over i, solve for
P
j ￿j ￿ Uj(a) and substitute this expression back into
(30) to obtain ￿ Ui(a) =
￿ ui(a)
r+￿ , where ￿ ui (a) is as in (7).
Step (ii). The expected discounted price of the asset at the next time when the investor




e￿(r+￿)sp(t + s)ds: (31)
Finally, substitute ￿ Ui(a) =
￿ ui(a)
r+￿ and (31) into (29) and multiply through by (r + ￿) to obtain
the formulation of the investor￿ s problem in the statement of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. Rewrite (8) as







and di⁄erentiate with respect to t to obtain




Integrate this expression forward and use limt!1 e￿rtp(t) = 0 to arrive at (10).
21Proof of Lemma 3. We proceed in three steps: (i) derive nji(￿;t), (ii) derive n0
ji(A;t) and
(iii) obtain Ht(A;I) for an arbitrary (A;I) 2 ￿.
Step (i). The density measure of investors who last readjusted their asset holdings at
time t ￿ ￿ > 0 is ￿e￿￿￿. The probability that an investor who last contacted a dealer
at time t ￿ ￿ has a history of preference types involving k(t ￿ ￿) = j and k(t) = i is
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿￿
￿i + Ifi=jge￿￿￿. Since the measure of investors with preference type j at time t ￿ ￿
is nj(t ￿ ￿), and the Poisson process for meeting dealers and the compound Poisson process
for preference shocks are independent, the density measure of investors who last traded at
time t ￿ ￿ and who have a history of preferences involving k(t ￿ ￿) = j and k(t) = i, is
nji (￿;t) = ￿e￿￿￿ ￿￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿￿
￿i + Ifi=jge￿￿￿￿
nj (t ￿ ￿), as given by (16).
Step (ii). The measure of investors who have not contacted a dealer up to time t is e￿￿t.
Since the Poisson meeting process is independent of investors￿individual states, the time-t
measure of investors whose asset holdings and preference types lied in the set (A;fjg) at time 0
and who have not yet met a dealer at time t is e￿￿tH0 (A;fjg). The measure of investors who




the time-t measure of investors who at time 0 had preference type j and assets in A, whose
preference type is i at the current time t, and who have never traded (so their asset holdings
are still in A) is n0




H0(A;fjg), as given in (15).
Step (iii). Ht(A;I) is the measure of investors who have an individual state (a;i) 2 (A;I)





ji(A;t), namely those investors who never
contacted dealers but who were holding asset positions in the set A at time 0 and whose
preference types at t lie in I. The time-t measure of investors of type i who chose an asset
position in the set A the last time they traded, given that their preference type at that time
was j, is
R t
0 Ifaj(t￿￿)2Agnji(￿;t)d￿. Thus, the second term in Ht(A;I), namely the measure
of investors who the last time they traded chose asset positions that belong to the set A and







Proof of Proposition 1. For all t ￿ 0, the distribution fni(t)gI




i=1 ni(t)ai(q) : ai(q) 2 argmaxa0￿0 [￿ ui(a0) ￿ qa0]
o
for q 2 (q(t);+1),
where q(t) = maxi2X ￿ u0
i(1)Ifni(t)>0g. (If q ￿ q(t) then (9) has no solution for some i such that
ni(t) > 0.) Given that ui (and hence ￿ ui) is strictly concave and continuously di⁄erentiable, ai(q)
is uniquely determined for all q 2 (q(t);+1) and all i such that ni(t) > 0, and it is continuous.
Consequently, Ad
t(q) is singled-valued and continuous for q 2 (q(t);+1). Moreover, (9) implies
22that any interior choice ai(t) is a strictly decreasing function of q(t) for every i. Thus, Ad
t(q) is
strictly decreasing for all q 2 (q (t); ￿ q(t)), where ￿ q(t) = maxi2X ￿ u0
i(0)Ifni(t)>0g, and Ad
t(q) = f0g
for all q ￿ ￿ q(t). As q # q(t), Ad
t(q) ! +1, and as q " ￿ q(t), Ad
t(q) ! 0. So for each
t there is a unique q(t) 2 (q (t); ￿ q(t)) such that Ad
t [q (t)] = fAg or equivalently, such that
PI
i=1 ni(t)ai [q (t)] = A. Given this q(t), there is a unique fai(t)gI
i=1 that solves (9). Given
q(t), (11) gives the fee ￿i(a;t) for every i and a. Finally, given fai(t)gI
i=1 the distribution Ht is
given by (14).
Proof of Proposition 2. Calculations similar to those contained in part (i) of the proof of
Lemma 1 imply (r + ￿)^ Ui(a) = r+￿
r+￿+￿ui (a) + ￿
r+￿+￿
PI
j=1 ￿juj (a). Substitute this expression













4 r + ￿
r + ￿ + ￿
ui[ai(t)] +
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r + ￿ + ￿
ui[ai(t)] +
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where ￿(t) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. Since L(t) is
strictly jointly concave in fai(t)g
I
i=1, the ￿rst-order necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the
problem maxfai(t)g L(t) are
(r + ￿)u0




r + ￿ + ￿
￿ ￿(t), ￿ = ￿ if ai(t) > 0, (32)




i [￿(t)] = A (33)
where a￿
i [￿(t)] is the ai that satis￿es (32). Comparing (33) with (13), (32) with (9), and setting
q(t) = ￿(t), it becomes clear that (9) coincides with (32) if and only if ￿ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. From (12), limt!1 ni(t) = ￿i for each i. By an argument similar to
the one in the proof of Proposition 1, one can establish that there is a unique, time-invariant, q





i=1 and q satisfy (18) and (19). Given the fact that q (t) = q for all t,
(10) implies p = q=r. Given q and faig
I
i=1, (11) implies (20), which determines the time invariant
fees f￿i (a)g
I
i=1. To derive (21), start from Lemma 3 and note that limt!1 n0
ji(A;t) = 0 for


















for all (A;I) 2 ￿. To conclude, observe that H(faig;fjg) =
R 1
0 nij (￿;1)d￿ and carry out the
integration to obtain (21).










The denominator of this expression is strictly positive (from (22)), so focus on the sign of the
















("i ￿ ￿ "):
Suppose ￿[u0(a)]
2 =u00(a) is strictly increasing in a. Let ￿ a denote the a that solves (22) for ￿ "i = ￿ ".
Then, note that ￿[u0(ai)]
2 ("i ￿ ￿ ")=u00(ai) ￿ ￿[u0(￿ a)]
2 ("i ￿ ￿ ")=u00(￿ a) for each i, with strict




@￿ > 0 and consequently,
dp
d￿ > 0. Similar
reasoning implies
dp
d￿ < 0 if ￿[u0(a)]
2 =u00(a) is strictly decreasing and
dp
d￿ = 0 if ￿[u0(a)]
2 =u00(a)
is constant in a.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Let ai (￿) denote the individual demand of an investor with













(r+￿)"1+￿￿ " for all j > 1, and




(r+￿)"I+￿￿ " for all j < I. The di⁄erence ai(￿0) ￿ ai(￿) is








(r + ￿0)~ a
￿ [(r + ￿0)~ " + ￿￿ "]
>
(r + ￿)~ a









24so ai(￿0) as a function of "i intersects ai(￿) from below. Hence ~ " is unique, and ai (￿0) < ai (￿)
for all "i < ~ " and ai (￿0) > ai (￿) for all "i > ~ ". With (21), the cumulative distribution of
assets indexed by ￿, is G￿(a) =
PI
j=1 Ifaj(￿)￿ag￿j. The fact that ai (￿0) < ai (￿) for "i < ~ "


























0 G￿(x)dx for all
a ￿ 0, i.e., G￿ second-order stochastically dominates G￿0.
(ii) From (7), as r+￿ ! 0 then ￿ ui(a) ! ￿
PI
j=1 ￿juj(a) which is independent of i. Together
with market clearing, this implies that ai ! A for all i 2 f1;::;Ig as r + ￿ ! 0.




[a2 (￿) ￿ a1 (￿)];
where ai (￿) is given by (34). Since "1 < "2, we have a1 (￿) < a2 (￿), and by part (i) of Propo-
sition 5,
da1(￿)
d￿ < 0 <
da2(￿)
d￿ . To ￿nd dV
d￿, we consider two cases. (a) An increase in ￿ caused by









> 0. (b) An
















(ii) Since ui (a) = "i lna, we have ai > 0 for all i, and ai 6= aj unless i = j. From (21),
the proportion of trades that involve buying ai and selling aj or vice versa (for i 6= j) is
(nij + nji)=(1￿
PI
i=1 nii) = 2￿i￿j=(1￿
PI
i=1 ￿2
i ), which is independent of ￿. From Proposition




￿ ("i ￿ "j)
rp(r + ￿ + ￿)
2:
Thus, jai ￿ ajj = jgi(￿;p) ￿ gj(￿;p)j increases with ￿ for all i 6= j. The measure of trades of











which is decreasing in ￿. This establishes that the distribution of trade sizes associated with ￿0
￿rst-order stochastically dominates the one associated with ￿ if ￿0 > ￿. Since every trade size
is larger in the market with a larger ￿, we conclude that V increases with ￿.
25(iii) This follows immediately from (24) and part (ii) of Proposition 5.








i (a) ￿ q
￿
:
Suppose that the nonnegativity constraint on ai is slack. Then, since ￿ ui is strictly concave and
￿ u0
i (ai) ￿ q = 0, we know that ￿ u0
i (a) ￿ q < 0 if and only if a ￿ ai > 0, and
@￿i(a)
@a has the same
sign as a ￿ ai. If ai = 0, then a > ai and ￿ u0
i (a) ￿ q < ￿ u0
i (ai) ￿ q ￿ 0, so
@￿i(a)
@a > 0 which is the
same sign as a ￿ ai = a > 0. This establishes the ￿rst part. To show the second part, divide











￿ ui (ai) ￿ ￿ ui (a) ￿ ￿ u0





which strictly negative since ￿ ui is strictly concave.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let q (￿;r), ai (￿;r) and ￿ji (￿;r) denote, respectively, the equilib-
rium q, ai and ￿ji that solve (18), (19) and (20) for all i;j 2 X. We proceed in three steps:
(i) show that ￿ji (￿;r) > 0 for all ￿ 2 (0;1) and all r 2 [0;1) provided ai (￿;r) 6= aj (￿;r)
and ￿ > 0; (ii) establish that lim￿!1 ￿ji (￿;r) = 0 for any r ￿ 0 and all (i;j) 2 X2; (iii) show
that for each ￿ 2 (0;1) there is ￿ r > 0 such that ￿ji (0;r) < ￿ji (￿;r) for all r 2 (0; ￿ r). The
nonmonotonicity of ￿ji (￿;r) with respect to ￿ for all r 2 [0; ￿ r) will then follow from steps (i)
through (iii).
(i) From (20), ￿ij =
￿
r+￿ fmaxa0 [￿ ui (a0;￿;r) ￿ qa0] ￿ [￿ ui (aj;￿;r) ￿ qaj]g, so ￿ij (￿;r) > 0
for all ￿ 2 (0;1) and all r 2 [0;1) provided ￿ > 0 and aj 6= argmaxa0￿0 [￿ ui (a0) ￿ qa0] (i.e.,
provided the investor trades).
(ii) lim￿!1 q (￿;r) = q￿ and lim￿!1 ai (￿;r) = argmaxa0￿0 [ui (a0) ￿ q￿a0] ￿ h1
i (q￿),
where q￿ is independent of r and solves
PI
i=1 ￿ih1
i (q￿) = A, which in turn implies q￿ 2 (0;1),
h1
i (q￿) < 1, and hence jui (aj) ￿ q￿ajj < 1 for all (i;j) 2 X2. Therefore lim￿!1 ￿ij (￿;r) = 0
for any r ￿ 0 and all (i;j) 2 X2.
(iii) Let ￿ ! 0 to obtain q (0;r) = ~ q(r) and ai (0;r) = argmaxa0￿0 [~ ui (a0) ￿ ~ qa0] ￿ h0
i (~ q),
where ~ ui (a;r) =
rui(a)+￿~ u(a)
r+￿ , ~ u(a) =
PI
k=1 ￿kuk (a) and ~ q solves
PI
i=1 ￿ih0




r[ui(ai) ￿ ui(aj)] + ￿
PI
k=1 ￿k [uk(ai) ￿ uk(aj)]
o
￿ (r + ￿) ~ q(r)(ai ￿ aj)
(r + ￿)r
: (35)
26Observe that limr!0 ai (0;r) = ~ u0￿1 [~ q (0)] = A, for each i 2 X. Totally di⁄erentiate (18)












@r = 0. Combine these conditions to get




k(A) = 0 which together








k(A). With this, apply L￿ H￿pital￿ s rule to (35) to ￿nd limr!0 ￿ji (0;r) = 0.
Our assumptions on primitives imply that q (￿;r) and ai (￿;r) are continuous functions, so
￿ji (￿;r) is continuous. Hence, for each (i;j) with i 6= j and each ￿ 2 (0;1), there is some
￿ r > 0 such that for all r 2 [0; ￿ r), we have lim￿!1 ￿ji (￿;r) = 0 < ￿ji (￿;r) (by (i) and (ii))
and ￿ji (0;r) < ￿ji (￿;r) (by (i) and (iii)), which establishes the nonmonotonicity of ￿ij with
respect to ￿.
Proof of Corollary 1. Write ￿(￿;￿;r) =
PI
i;j=1 nji (￿)￿ji [￿(1 ￿ ￿);r], where nji (￿) is
given by (21). Fix an arbitrary (￿;￿) 2 (0;1)￿(0;1). From part (i) of the proof of Proposition
7, ￿Ij [￿(1 ￿ ￿);r] > 0 for j < I and all r 2 [0;1). Hence ￿(￿;￿;r) > 0 for all ￿(1 ￿ ￿) 2
(0;1) and all r 2 [0;1). Following a similar reasoning as in part (iii) of the proof of Proposition
7, for each (i;j) 2 X2, there is ￿ rji > 0 such that for all r 2 [0; ￿ rji), ￿ji (0;r) < ￿(￿;￿;r). Then
￿(0;￿;r) < ￿(￿;￿;r) for any r 2 [0;r0), where r0 = min(i;j)2X2 ￿ rji. Finally, from part (ii)
of the proof of Proposition 7, for any r ￿ 0 we have lim￿0!1 ￿(￿0;￿;r) = 0 < ￿(￿;￿;r),
which establishes the nonmonotonicity of ￿ with respect to ￿, and therefore with respect to
￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿).
Proof of Proposition 8. In an equilibrium with entry the measure of dealers satis￿es
￿[￿(￿);￿;r] = ￿￿1￿￿: (36)
From Corollary 1, there is ~ r > 0 such that ￿ ￿ ￿(0;￿;r) < sup￿ ￿[￿(￿);￿;r] ￿ ￿ for all
r 2 [0; ~ r), and lim￿!1 ￿[￿(￿);￿;r] = 0 < ￿. Note that as ￿ ! 1, ￿￿1￿￿ converges uniformly
to ￿ on any closed interval [￿0;￿1] ￿ (0;1). Thus, for any ￿ 2 (￿;￿), there is a ~ ￿ such that for
for all ￿ 2 (~ ￿;1), there are multiple values of ￿ > 0 that satisfy (36).
27B Generalized preference shocks
Continuous-time Markov chain
Consider an homogeneous, ergodic, continuous-time Markov chain with a ￿nite number I of
states. The transitions between the states f1;:::;Ig are described by an in￿nitesimal generator
matrix ￿ = [￿ij]. The time that an investor spends in the preference state i is exponentially
distributed with parameter
P
k6=i ￿ik > 0. Conditional on a transition, the probability to
move to state j is ￿ij=
P
k6=i ￿ik 2 [0;1] where ￿ij is referred to as the transition intensity. By
convention, ￿ii = ￿
P
k6=i ￿ik so that the rows of the generator matrix sum to 0. The formulation
studied in the body of the paper corresponds to ￿ki = ￿￿i if k 6= i and ￿ii = ￿(￿i ￿ 1).
Denote ￿ij(t) = Pr[k(t) = j jk(0) = i] where k(t) is the investor￿ s preference type at time t.
The matrix of transition probabilities over a time interval of length t is denoted R(t) = [￿ij(t)].23
Then, the dynamics for the transition probabilities satisfy R0(t) = R(t)￿ with R(0) = I (where
I is the identity matrix).24 The solution to this di⁄erential equation is












(r + ￿)￿ Ui(a) ￿ q(t)a
￿
; (38)
23For the i.i.d. speci￿cation in the paper,
￿ij(t) = (1 ￿ e
￿￿t)￿j + e
￿￿tIfi=jg:
Suppose i 6= j. With probability 1 ￿ e
￿￿t at least one preference shock occurs over the time interval of length t.
Since shocks are i.i.d., k(t) = j with probability ￿j. If i = j one must also take into account the probability that
no shocks occur over the time interval of length t.
24The dynamics for the transition probabilities are as follows:











The ￿rst term on the right-hand side is the probability to reach state j at time t from state i at time 0 multiplied
by the probability that no preference shocks occur on a small intervall of time of length dt. The second term of
the right-hand side is the sum of the probabilities to reach state k 6= j at time t multiplied by the probabilities
to reach state j from state k in a small time interval of length dt. Rearrange, divide both sides by dt, and take



















; i 2 f1;:::;Ig (40)
where T￿, the next e⁄ective contact time with a dealer, is exponentially distributed with para-
meter ￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿). We obtain the following generalization of Lemma 1 in the text.
Lemma 5 An investor with preference type i and asset holdings a who readjusts his asset
position at time t chooses ai solution to
ai(t) = argmax
a￿0










(r + ￿)￿ij(s)e￿(r+￿)sds: (43)
Proof. Reexpress ￿ Ui(a) given by (40) as




























To obtain the second equality we use that T￿ is exponentially distributed with parameter ￿.
The third equality is obtained by changing the order of integration. Since ￿ ui(a) = (r+￿)￿ Ui(a),
we get (43). The maximization problem (41) is then derived from (38)
From (43) it is easy to check that zij ￿ 0 and
PI
j=1 zij = 1. So, from (42), the investor
maximizes a weighted average of the utility ￿ ows in the di⁄erent states. The weight that an
investor of type i assigns to state j, zij, is a weighted average of the transition probabilities ￿ij(t).
29A reduction in trading frictions implies that investors care more about transitions occurring
over shorter time intervals.
It will also prove useful to have an alternative representation of the weights fzikg based
on the in￿nitesimal generator matrix ￿. Let Z denote the I ￿ I matrix with generic element
zij 2 [0;1], and I is the identity matrix.








Proof. Integrate (43) by parts and use that ￿0
ij(t) =
PI
k=1 ￿ik(t)￿kj (see footnote 24) to get




Since R(0) = I then (r + ￿)(Z ￿ I) = Z￿, which gives (44).25
The expression for the intermediation fee is similar to the one in the text, i.e.,
￿i (a;t) =
￿ f￿ ui [ai (t)] ￿ ￿ ui(a) ￿ q(t)[ai (t) ￿ a]g
r + ￿
(45)









ni(t)ai(t) = A: (47)













for all (A;I) 2 ￿; (48)
25The invertibility of the matrix (r + ￿)I ￿ ￿ can be proved as follows. Consider the set of bounded func-
tions B(f0;:::;Ig) with the sup norm. For some given u = [ui] 2 R
I, let T : B(f0;:::;Ig) ! B(f0;:::;Ig)












. The solution x 2 R
I to (r + ￿)x =









2 (0;1). From the Contraction Mapping Theorem, T has a
unique ￿xed point. Hence, ((r + ￿)I ￿ ￿)x = u admits a unique solution for any u 2 R




ji(A;t) = e￿￿t￿ji(t)H0(A;fjg) (49)
and
nji(￿;t) = ￿e￿￿￿￿ji(￿)nj(t ￿ ￿): (50)
The interpretations for n0
ji(A;t) and nji(￿;t) are similar to the ones in the text. For instance,
n0
ji(A;t) is the measure of investors who have not contacted a dealer on [0;t], an event oc-
curring with probability e￿￿t, with initial state in A ￿ fjg, there is a measure H0(A;fjg) of
such investors, and with preference type k(t) = i, an event occurring with probability ￿ji(t)
conditional on the initial state.
An equilibrium is a time-path hfai(t)g;q(t);f￿i(a;t)g;Hti that satis￿es (41), (45), (47) and
(48), given an initial condition H0. Despite the generalization of the process for the preference
shocks, the model keeps its simple recursive structure. The distribution fni(t)g solves (46).
Given fni(t)g, (41) and (47) yield q(t) and fai(t)g. Given q(t) and fai(t)g one can determine
the intermediation fees from (45). Proposition 1 in the text can be generalized to show existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Frictionless limit






! I, ￿ ui(a) ! ui(a), and (41) becomes maxa￿0 [ui(a) ￿ q(t)a]. (Alternatively,
from (43), zij ! ￿ij(0) = Ifi=jg as ￿ ! +1.) As the trading frictions vanish, the allocations























The solution is such that ^ U0
i [ai(t)] ￿ ￿(t) for all i 2 f1;:::Ig, with a strict equality if ai(t) > 0,
where ￿(t) is the multiplier associated with the resource constraint. The comparison of (40)
31and (51) reveals the following di⁄erence between the investors￿ problem and the planner￿ s
problem: the time horizon of the investors￿problem is exponentially distributed with parameter
￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿) while the time horizon of the planner￿ s problem is exponentially distributed with
parameter ￿. The two coincide when ￿ = 0.
Steady state
As t tends to in￿nity, ￿ij(t) approaches ￿j where f￿igI
i=1 is the unique ergodic distribution
that solves [￿1;:::;￿I]￿ = 0 and
PI
i=1 ￿i = 1. From (46), ni(t) ! ￿i and the market-clearing
condition (47) becomes
PI
i=1 ￿iai = A where, from (41), ai = argmaxa￿0 [￿ ui(a) ￿ qa]. Finally,










for all (A;I) 2 ￿:
Asset holdings, prices and volume
We focus on steady states and in order to guarantee the interiority and the existence of a
solution to (41) we also assume that u0
i(0) = 1 and u0
i(1) = 0. From Lemma 5, the choice of




k(ai) = rp: (52)
We ￿rst investigate the e⁄ects of a change in trading frictions (￿) on investors￿asset holdings
taking the asset price p as given. Let ai = gi(￿;p) denote the solution to (52).
Lemma 7
@gi(￿;p)
































As trading frictions are reduced investors readjust the weights zij they assign to their mar-
ginal utilities from holding the asset in di⁄erent states and put more weights on transitions
occurring over shorter time intervals.
The next Proposition investigates a class of preference shocks that encompasses the i.i.d.




j(ai) is increasing (decreasing) in t then
@gi(￿;p)
@￿ > 0 (< 0).
Proof. Substituting zik by its expression given by (43) and using the change of variable








































k(ai) is increasing (decreasing) in t then
@gi(￿;p)
@￿ < 0 (> 0).
Proposition 9 is intuitive. If the expected marginal utility from holding the asset is increasing




j(ai)) then a reduction in the trading
frictions will induce agents to reduce their asset holdings. In the case of multiplicative preference
shocks, ui(a) = "iu(a), Proposition 9 implies that if
PI
j=1 ￿ij(t)"j is monotone then ai increases
as trading frictions are reduced if "i > ￿ " =
PI
j=1 ￿j"j.
Proposition 9 has the following immediate implication for the case of i.i.d. shocks studied
in the paper.
Corollary 2 If preference shocks are i.i.d. then
@gi(￿;p)































j(ai) and decreasing in t





The following proposition allows for general preference shocks but it focuses on economies
where trading frictions are small. With a small abuse of notation, rede￿ne ai = gi( 1
r+￿;p) as
the choice of asset holdings characterized by (52).














Proof. Denote x = (r + ￿)￿1. From (44),
I X
k=1
zik￿kj = (r + ￿)(zij ￿ Ifj=ig); j = 1;:::;I: (57)























@x > 0 i⁄
PI
k=1 ￿iku0
k(ai) > 0, which gives (56).
In a liquid market (￿ ! 1) investors only care about their current preference type to choose
their asset holdings, i.e., zii = 1. As trading frictions increase investors increase the weights
they assign to their marginal utilities in future states. The increase of zij is proportional to the
transition intensity ￿ij from state i to state j.











This condition is identical to the one in G￿rleanu (2006, Proposition 2).26 It reveals that an
increase in the trading frictions does not necessarily result in asset holdings closer to the per-
capital supply. Indeed, an investor with a high valuation for the asset may have an even higher
26In Garleanu￿ s model, the coe¢ cient "i is interpreted as the instantaneous correlation between the asset
dividend and the endowment of the investor. So when (60) holds the current correlation is less than the expected
future correlation and investors increase their positions as frictions are reduced.
34valuation in the near future in which case (60) holds. However, as a consequence of Proposition
10, the support of the distribution of asset holdings shrinks as trading frictions become more
severe.
Corollary 3 Suppose u0
1(a) < ::: < u0























k<I ￿Ik < u0
I(aI).
In Propositions 9 and 10, we have taken the asset price as given. In the next proposition we
show that some speci￿cation for the utility function the asset price is una⁄ected by the trading
frictions.
































i=1 ￿i￿ik(s) = ￿k (by de￿nition of a steady-state distribution) then
PI
i=1 ￿izik = ￿k
and (62) gives (61).
If preferences are logarithmic, the asset price at the steady state is independent of the extent
of the frictions. For this speci￿cation, the partial equilibrium results for individual portfolios
obtained in Propositions 9 and 10 are also general equilibrium results.
From Corollary 3, starting from a liquid market, the support of the distribution of asset
holdings shrinks as trading frictions increase. The next proposition focuses on the limit when
trading frictions become in￿nite and investors are patient.
35Proposition 12 If r + ￿ ! 0 then ai ! A for all i 2 f1;:::;Ig.
Proof. Take the limit of (57) as r + ￿ ! 0 to get:
I X
k=1
zik￿kj = 0; j = 1;:::;I;
or, equivalently, Z￿ = 0. By de￿nition of the ergodic distribution f￿ig is the unique solution to
PI
k=1 ￿k = 1 and [￿1;:::;￿I]￿ = 0. Consequently, [zi1;:::;ziI] approaches [￿1;:::;￿I] for all i 2
f1;:::;Ig. Hence, (41) becomes maxa
hPI
k=1 ￿kuk(a) ￿ q(t)a
i
and ai ! A for all i 2 f1;:::;Ig.
If investors are patient and trade in an illiquid market then they maximize their average
utility where the weight assigned to a state i is the fraction of the time that the investor will
spend in this state over his in￿nite life horizon, ￿i. From Proposition 12, the distribution of
asset holdings becomes concentrated towards its mean as the trading frictions become very
severe. As a consequence, the trade volume goes to 0. For instance, if the dealer￿ s bargaining
power approaches 1 then all investors choose an asset position close to the per capital supply
of assets.
36C Strategic bargaining
In the body of the paper we assumed that when an investor and a dealer trade, the new asset
position of the investor, a0, and the fee, ￿, are the solution to a Nash bargaining problem where
the dealer has bargaining power ￿ 2 [0;1] and disagreement point W (t), and the investor has
disagreement point Vi (a;t). In this appendix we o⁄er four strategic bargaining games, each
with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that coincides with the solution of the
axiomatic Nash bargaining problem we have adopted.
The four games we consider have the common feature that the relationship between the
investor and the dealer is short-lived in that the negotiation takes place in an ￿instant.￿In the
￿rst game, a proposer is chosen at random to make a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er. The second is a
standard bargaining game with alternating o⁄ers and a random termination of the negotiation.
We take the limit of this game as the expected time horizon for the negotiation goes to zero.
The third is the o⁄-the-shelf bargaining game of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986)
incorporated into a discrete-time version of our model. Here we assume that the negotiation
takes place within a period but may involve an in￿nite number of bargaining rounds. Finally,
we consider a payo⁄-equivalent game that can involve at most two bargaining rounds. The fact
that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in each of these four games coincides
with the solution of the Nash problem as formulated in Section 3, is an indication that the
disagreement points we have adopted in our axiomatic formulation are the appropriate ones
when the relationship between dealers and investors is essentially instantaneous, as is the case
in our environment.
C.1 Take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er by a randomly chosen proposer
Our theory is meant to model a fast moving market where investors and dealers don￿ t form
long-lasting relationships, but rather contact each other at relatively high frequencies and must
trade on the spot, instantaneously, before they part ways. With this in mind, consider the
following natural and simple strategic bargaining game. Upon contact, with probability ￿,
Nature selects the dealer to make an instantaneous take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er which the investor
must either accept or reject on the spot. With complementary probability, Nature selects the
investor to make an instantaneous take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er which the dealer must either accept
or reject on the spot. The whole process is instantaneous, and the dealer and the investor part







denote the proposal that the dealer makes to an investor of type i who






denote the o⁄er that the latter makes to the former.













￿ ￿ ￿ Vi (a;t)
￿
:
Similarly, the set of o⁄ers that a dealer ￿nds acceptable at time t is A1 = f(a0;￿) : ￿ ￿ 0g. If










where the maximization is subject to a0 ￿ 0, and IA2
i(a;t)(a0;￿) is an indicator function that is
equal to 1 if (a0;￿) 2 A2
i (a;t). It is easy to see that a1
i (t) = ai (t), where ai (t) is as in (3), and
￿￿1

























where the maximization is subject to a0 ￿ 0, and IA1(a0;￿) is an indicator function that is equal
to 1 if (a0;￿) 2 A1. Hence, a2
i (t) = ai (t) and ￿2
i (a;t) = 0. Note that regardless of who gets
selected to make the o⁄er, the outcome of the negotiation is that the investor exits the meeting
with asset position ai (t). The transaction fee equals ￿i (a;t)=￿ if the dealer makes the o⁄er
and 0 if the investor makes the o⁄er, so the expected fee (before Nature decides who will make
the o⁄er) equals ￿i (a;t). It is easy to check that with these equilibrium outcomes the investors￿
and dealers￿value functions are just as in the body of the paper and all our results go through
(subject to the obvious reinterpretation of ￿i (a;t) as an expected intermediation fee, which is
inconsequential).
C.2 Alternating o⁄ers in continuous time with random termination
Consider a strategic alternating o⁄ers bargaining game similar to the one analyzed by Rubin-
stein (1982), but extended to allow for exogenous breakdown in negotiations as in Binmore,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). The game we analyze belongs to the class of stochastic se-
quential bargaining games studied by Merlo and Wilson (1995). Time is continuous and we
27This type of bargaining procedure has been used extensively in search models of money, e.g., Burdett, Trejos
and Wright (2001) as well as in search models of the labor market, e.g., Kiyotaki and Lagos (2007).
38assume that negotiations between an investor an a dealer who meet at time t take place at
￿ = t, t + ￿, t + 2￿, ... , where ￿ > 0 is the length of the period of time between two consec-
utive bargaining rounds. In every bargaining round, Nature selects a player to make an o⁄er
(a0;￿); the dealer is selected with probability ￿ (which we will also denote ￿1) and the investor
with probability 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2. If the recipient of the o⁄er accepts it, the trade is consummated
instantaneously and the match is dissolved. If the recipient rejects the o⁄er, the pair waits
for a period of length ￿ until the next bargaining round. During this period of time between
bargaining rounds, the dealer-investor match is subject to a Poisson destruction process with
arrival rate ￿. (This process is independent across matches an also independent of the investor￿ s
process for preference shocks.) If the match survives until the next bargaining round, Nature
again selects the player who will make the next o⁄er, and so on. To keep the analysis simple
we describe the negotiations that take place once the market has reached the long-run steady
state described in Proposition 3.
Consider an investor with asset holdings a who enters a negotiation round with a dealer.
The payo⁄ to the dealer if an agreement (a0;￿) is reached at time ￿ ￿ t is e￿r(￿￿t)W(￿), where
W(￿) ￿ ￿ + W and rW = ￿
R
￿i(a)dH(a;i). Similarly, the payo⁄ to the investor from an
agreement (a0;￿) reached at time ￿ ￿ t when his preference type is i is e￿r(￿￿t)Ui(a0;￿), where
Ui(a0;￿) ￿ Vi(a0) ￿ p(a0 ￿ a) ￿ ￿, with
Vi(a) =







j=1 ￿j￿j and ￿i = maxa0￿0 [￿ ui (a0) ￿ rpa0]. If no agreement is reached,
the (current value of) the payo⁄ is W(0) to the dealer and Ui(a;0) to the investor. There are
gains from trade between an investor with preference type i who holds a and a dealer if




￿ [Vi(a) ￿ pa] > 0; (64)
i.e., as long as a 6= ai ￿ argmaxa0￿0 [Vi(a0) ￿ pa0]. For the time being we focus on the case
where (64) holds; the analysis will be completed toward the end of the section.
A strategy for a player is a contingent plan that indicates which o⁄er to make following
every history after which it is the player￿ s turn to make an o⁄er, and which o⁄ers to accept or
reject after every history where it is the player￿ s turn to respond. The equilibrium concept we
adopt is subgame perfect equilibrium and we restrict attention to stationary strategies.28 The
28In our context, a strategy pro￿le is stationary if the actions prescribed at any history depend only on the
39fact that the investor￿ s preference type follows a stochastic process implies that the gains from
trade also follow a stochastic process. In this setting, Merlo and Wilson (1995) have shown that
agreement may turn out to be delayed in the subgame perfect equilibrium. We carry out the
analysis under the conjecture that an agreement will not be delayed, and later verify that this




i) denote the proposal that the dealer makes to an investor of type i who is
holding a, and (a2
i;￿2







i=1 are accepted by dealers, the set of o⁄ers that an investor of type i who is







































On the left side of the inequality that de￿nes the set A2
i (a), is the utility to the investor with
preference type i and asset holdings a from immediate agreement to an o⁄er (a0;￿). On the
right side of the inequality is his discounted expected utility from rejecting such an o⁄er: he
may receive a preference shock (with probability approximately equal to ￿￿), negotiations may
break down (with probability approximately equal to ￿￿), and in the event that negotiations
do not break down, he is selected to make an o⁄er with probability ￿2 and to respond to the




























current o⁄er and the investor￿ s current asset holdings and preference type. A subgame perfect equilibrium in
stationary strategies is often referred to as a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. Since we ￿nd a unique
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, the restriction to stationary strategies is innocuous for our
purposes because the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game we are considering is unique
if and only if the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is unique. See Merlo and Wilson (1995).








i (a) to emphasize the fact that the o⁄ers may depend not only on







i are independent of a for all i. The fee proposed by the dealer, ￿
1
i, will depend on the investor￿ s
asset holdings a, so when ￿
1
i appears, we really mean ￿
1
i (a).
40Under the conjecture that agreement is not delayed in equilibrium, when it is his turn to
propose, an investor of type i chooses the o⁄er that maximizes his own payo⁄ from the set of
o⁄ers that are acceptable to the dealer, i.e.,
(a2
i;￿2
i) = arg max
(a0;￿)2A1 Ui(a0;￿);
where the maximization is subject to a0 ￿ 0. It is easy to show that a2















































where the maximization is subject to a0 ￿ 0. For all i, the solution has a1




















































1+r￿ ￿i (a) ￿
(1￿￿￿)￿￿
1+r￿ ￿ ￿(a) +
(r+￿)￿
1+r￿ Vi (a) ￿ ￿￿
1+r￿ ￿ V (a);
with ￿ ￿(a) =
PI
j=1 ￿j￿j (a) and ￿ V (a) =
PI















































Next, we follow Binmore (1987) and consider the case where the time between each o⁄er and
countero⁄er vanishes. This means that, no matter what the expected duration of the match
may be (i.e., for any ￿), the dealer and the investor may in principle engage in an in￿nite
number of bargaining rounds before the negotiation terminates. As we let ￿ ! 0, from (67)
and (68) we ￿nd lim￿!0 ￿1
i = lim￿!0 ￿2
i = ’i (a;￿), where
’i (a;￿) = ￿
n





Vi (a) ￿ ￿ V (a)
￿o
:
Our theory is intended as a model of a fast moving market with ￿ eeting contacts between
dealers and investors. To capture this idea, we consider the limit case where the average
duration of the meeting between the dealer and the investor vanishes. As ￿ ! 1, we ￿nd
’i (a;￿) ! ￿￿i (a). Then, since (64) and (63) imply ￿i (a) =
￿ ui(ai)￿￿ ui(a)￿rp(ai￿a)
r+￿ , we conclude
that lim￿!1 ’i (a;￿) = ￿i (a), where ￿i (a) is as in (20).
To conclude, we verify that the su¢ cient condition in Merlo and Wilson (1998) that en-
sures that agreement will not be delayed for any investor-dealer pair in the subgame perfect
equilibrium is satis￿ed as ￿ ! 1. The relevant condition is that the stochastic process for the








￿j￿j (a) + (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿i (a)
3
5 + o(￿);
where o(￿) is a function with the property that lim￿!0
o(￿)
￿ = 0. If we rearrange this condition
and let ￿ go to zero, it becomes
￿i (a) ￿
￿
r + ￿ + ￿
￿ ￿(a):
Since ￿i (a) ￿ 0 for all i and a, this condition is satis￿ed as ￿ ! 1.
C.3 Alternating o⁄ers in a discrete-time formulation of the model
Here we consider a discrete-time version of our model in which the terms of trade in a bilateral
match between a dealer and an investor correspond to the outcome of an alternating o⁄ers
42bargaining game with exogenous risk of breakdown. The environment is similar to the one laid
out in the body of the paper, except that time is discrete and indexed by t = 0;1;:::. The
sequence of events within a time period is as follows. First, each investor enjoys utility ui(a)
associated with his current preference type, i, and asset position, a. Second, investors receive
preference shocks, and new contacts between dealers and investors take place. An investor
receives a preference shock with probability ￿ and contacts a dealer with probability ￿. We
assume that these events are mutually exclusive and that ￿+￿ < 1. Third, the dealer-investor
pairs bargain over the terms of the trade. We assume that although the negotiation occurs
within the period, it can take place over an in￿nite number of bargaining rounds indexed by
￿ 2 N. Lastly, the interdealer market opens and dealers execute trades on behalf of investors.
The interdealer market closes when the period ends, and at that point all trades between dealers
and investors are settled (assets are delivered and fees are paid) and all dealer-investor matches
are dissolved.
Let Vi (a;t) denote the maximum expected discounted utility attainable by an investor who
has preference type i and is holding a at the end of period t, after the interdealer market has
closed. It satis￿es




￿jVj(a;t) + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)Vi(a;t); (69)
where (1 + r)
￿1 denotes the discount factor. Similarly, let W (t) denote the maximum expected
discounted utility attainable by a dealer at the end of period t, after the interdealer market has
closed. It satis￿es
(1 + r)W (t ￿ 1) = ￿
Z
￿i(a;t)dHt(a;i) + (1 ￿ ￿)W (t): (70)
We now turn to the determination of the terms of trade. We adopt the strategic model with
exogenous risk of breakdown proposed by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). Consider
a meeting in period t between a dealer and an investor of type i who is holding a. The terms
of trade are determined through an alternating o⁄ers bargaining game. The game takes place
within the period but it is composed of a large number of rounds. The dealer is the ￿rst
proposer: he makes an o⁄er that is accepted or rejected by the respondent.30 An o⁄er is a pair
30Below we will eliminate the dealer￿ s ￿rst-mover advantage by considering the limit of the game where the
probabilities of breakdown between two consecutive rounds approach zero.
43(a0;￿) that speci￿es the new asset position of the investor and the intermediation fee paid to
the dealer. If rejected, the game moves to the second round where the investor can make a
countero⁄er. Between two consecutive rounds of negotiation the communication between the
investor and the dealer can break down. The probability of breakdown following an o⁄er by
a dealer is ￿1￿ while the probability of breakdown following an o⁄er made by an investor is
￿2￿. (The risk of breakdown acts as discounting between bargaining rounds and implies that
agents strictly prefer not to delay the agreement.) The payo⁄ to an investor with preference
type i if an agreement (a0;￿) is reached at time t is Ui(a0;￿;t) ￿ Vi(a0;t) ￿ p(t)(a0 ￿ a) ￿ ￿,
and the payo⁄ to the dealer is W(￿;t) ￿ ￿ + W(t). If no agreement is reached, the payo⁄ of
the investor is Ui(a;0;t) while the payo⁄ of the dealer is W(0;t). There are gains from trade
between an investor with preference type i who holds a and a dealer as long as




￿ [Vi(a;t) ￿ p(t)a] > 0; (71)
i.e., as long as a 6= ai (t) ￿ argmaxa0￿0 [Vi(a0;t) ￿ p(t)a0]. In what follows we focus on the
case where a 6= ai (t) and assume that if a = ai (t), the dealer proposes the no-trade o⁄er (a;0)
which is accepted by the investor.
A bargaining strategy is a contingent plan that indicates which o⁄er to make following every
history after which it is the player￿ s turn to make an o⁄er, and which o⁄ers to accept or reject
after every history where it is the player￿ s turn to respond to an o⁄er. The equilibrium concept
we adopt is subgame perfect equilibrium and we restrict attention to stationary strategies.31
Whenever it is his turn to make an o⁄er, the dealer proposes (a1;￿1) while the investor proposes
(a2;￿2). Assuming the o⁄er (a2;￿2) is accepted by dealers, the acceptance set at time t of an




(a0;￿) : Ui(a0;￿;t) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1￿)Ui(a2;￿2;t) + ￿1￿Ui(a;0;t)
￿
: (72)
A buyer accepts all o⁄ers that generate a payo⁄ greater or equal than his expected payo⁄
if he rejects the o⁄er and takes the chance to make a countero⁄er. In the latter case, the
investor makes the counter o⁄er (a2;￿2) with probability 1 ￿ ￿1￿, and with probability ￿1￿
the negotiation breaks down. Similarly, the acceptance set of a dealer is
A1 (t) =
￿
(a0;￿) : W(￿;t) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2￿)W(￿1;t) + ￿2￿W(0;t)
￿
: (73)
31This restriction is innocuous since the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game we are considering
is unique. See Proposition 3 in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) or Proposition 122.1 in Osborne and
Rubinstein (1994).
44When it is his turn to make a proposal, the investor chooses the o⁄er that maximizes his









where the maximization is subject to a0 ￿ 0. It is easy to show that a2
i (t) = ai (t) and
￿2
i (a;t) = (1 ￿ ￿2￿)￿1
i (a;t): (74)










where the maximization is subject to a0 ￿ 0. Hence, a1











+ ￿1￿Ui(a;0;t) or, equivalently,
￿i (a;t) ￿ ￿1
i (a;t) = (1 ￿ ￿1￿)
￿




Use (74) to substitute ￿2




1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1￿)(1 ￿ ￿2￿)
￿i (a;t): (75)






for k = 1;2, satisfy both agents￿participation
constraints.32
From (74) and (75), we see that lim￿!0 ￿2
i (a;t) = lim￿!0 ￿1
i (a;t) = ￿i(a;t), where ￿i(a;t)
is as in (4), with
￿1
￿1+￿2 ￿ ￿. It is possible to work out the rest of the model in discrete time. In
particular, one could let the length of a period be given by ￿0, assume that the probabilities ￿
and ￿, the rate of time preference, r, and the utility, ui(a), are all proportional to ￿0, and then
let ￿0 approach zero to obtain the same expressions we have in the body of the paper.
32For the dealer, this only requires ￿
k
i (a;t) ￿ 0 for k = 1;2 and all i. From (75),




1￿(1￿￿1￿)(1￿￿2￿)￿i (a;t) ￿ 0;






is preferred by the investor to no trade. It







45C.4 A single bargaining round in a discrete-time formulation of the model
In the context of the model analyzed in Section C.3, we could, instead of considering a bargaining
game with a potentially in￿nite number of rounds, adopt a simpler two-stage bargaining game
that delivers the same outcome. In the ￿rst stage the dealer makes an o⁄er that the investor
accepts or rejects. Following the investor￿ s decision to accept or reject, the bargaining ends
with probability ￿￿. (As in Section C.3, the risk of breakdown acts as discounting between
bargaining rounds and implies that agents strictly prefer not to delay the agreement.) With
probability 1 ￿ ￿￿ one of two players can make a countero⁄er without delay. Nature chooses
either the investor (with probability 1 ￿ ￿) or the dealer (with probability ￿) to make the
countero⁄er. The recipient of the countero⁄er chooses whether to accept or reject it, and
regardless of his action, the game ends and the two players part ways.







where ai(t) ￿ argmaxa0￿0 [Vi(a0;t) ￿ p(t)a0]. If the dealer is the proposer in the second stage,









s.t. Vi(a0;t) ￿ p(t)(a0 ￿ a) ￿ ￿ ￿ Vi (a;t) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿i (a;t)
and a0 ￿ 0. It is easy to see that a1
i (t) = ai(t) and ￿1
i (a;t) = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]￿i (a;t).
Therefore, also in this game we ￿nd lim￿!0 ￿1
i (a;t) = ￿i(a;t), where ￿i(a;t) is as in (4).
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47D Transversality condition
In this appendix we show that an equilibrium, the asset price p(t) necessarily satis￿es the
condition limt!1 e￿rtp(t) = 0, used in Lemma 1. The proof we o⁄er here is an adapted version
of a similar proof in Lagos, Rocheteau and Weill (2007).
Consider an investor who e⁄ectively contacts the market with Poisson intensity ￿. Let
fTng1
n=1 denote the sequence of contact times and Nt the number of contacts over the time
interval [0;t). We adopt the convention that T0 = 0 (but T0 is not a contact time). An asset
plan, a, for the investor speci￿es his asset holdings as a function time, s, and his history of
preference shocks and contact times, hk(s);fTng1
n=1i for s ￿ 0. Let a = a(s) denote an asset
plan. An asset plan is feasible if a(s) = a(Tn) for all s 2 [Tn;Tn+1) and a(0) = a0 > 0, which is
given. Let V t
i (a;0) be the expected discounted utility over the time interval [0;t) of an investor
with preference type i at time 0 who follows an asset plan a. It satis￿es
V t


















where the expectations operator, Ei, is taken with respect to the random variables hk(s);fTng1
n=1i
for s ￿ 0 and is indexed by i to indicate that the expectation is conditional on k(0) = i. Collect
terms to arrive at
V t





e￿rsuk(s) (a0)ds + IfT1￿tg
￿Z T1
0































where the expectations operator, E, is taken with respect to fTng1
n=1. It is shown in Lagos,
Rocheteau and Weill (2007, Lemma 2) that V t
i (a;0) converges to a ￿nite limit V 1
i (a;0) as
48t ! 1. After taking this limit we ￿nd
V 1
i (a;0) = Ei
￿Z T1
0
















To arrive at (77), note that Tn =
Xn
k=1 (Tk ￿ Tk￿1) is the sum of n independent exponentially-
distributed random variables, so limt!1 IfTn￿1￿t<Tng = 0 and limt!1 IfTn￿tg = 1 almost surely
for all ￿nite n ￿ 1. The former implies that the ￿rst term on the right-side of (76) converges
to 0 as t ! 1. The latter implies that the second term of (76) converges to the ￿rst term of
(77) and that the second and third terms of (76) converge to the second term of (77). To see









Any asset plan that is consistent with equilibrium must be bounded, hence the integrand of
(78) is bounded above. This integrand is also bounded below, since either u is bounded below
or else it satis￿es the Inada condition which ensures that any optimal plan has a(s) > 0 for
all s. The fact that t ￿ TNt < 1 almost surely (because t ￿ TNt is exponentially distributed)
implies that the integral in (78) is bounded. Finally, note that Pr(TNt < ￿) = e￿￿(t￿￿) for any
￿ < t, so TNt ! 1 almost surely as t ! 1, which means that (78) goes to 0 as t ! 1.
Now consider an optimal asset plan, a, and scale it down by 1￿". De￿ne ￿" ￿ V 1
i (a;0)￿
V 1

































49Since the asset plan a is optimal, we can take the limit as " ! 0, apply L￿ H￿pital￿ s Rule and




















for each investor. We can use the market-clearing condition to write
Z
￿
a!(t)d! = A; 8t;















since (79) holds for each !. Then TNt ! 1 almost surely as t ! 1, so limt!1 e￿rtp(t) = 0.
50E Related literature
In this appendix we draw connections to some related literature.
E.1 Search models of over-the-counter markets
Traders who operate in markets with OTC-style frictions will seek to mitigate these trading
frictions by adjusting their asset positions so as to reduce their trading needs. Our analysis
has shown that this a critical aspect of investor behavior in illiquid markets. To illustrate this
point, in this section we derive the main predictions of a version DGP￿ s model and contrast
them with those of a special case of our formulation. This comparison will underscore the fact
that the type of ￿liquidity hedging￿that we have identi￿ed￿ and that only becomes possible
with unrestricted asset holdings￿ generates new insights on how trading frictions shape the
various dimensions of market liquidity, alters the empirical predictions of the theory, and leads
to a di⁄erent assessment of their normative implications.
We will contrast the empirical predictions of DGP￿ s model with those of a special case of
our model with X = f1;2g and ui (a) = "i
a1￿￿
1￿￿ for i 2 X and ￿ > 0. We focus on the version of
DGP￿ s model with no inter-investor meetings (e.g., the version that DGP use in their Theorem
4 and part (i) of Theorem 6). DGP restrict a 2 f0;1g and let uij denote the ￿ ow utility
of an investor with asset position i 2 f0;1g and preference type j 2 f0;1g.33 DGP assume
u00 = u01 = 0, so for comparison purposes, we do the same hereafter. To simplify the notation,
in both models we let ￿ denote the steady-state fraction of investors with high valuation.34
Price. Since asset holdings are indivisible in DGP, equilibrium in the interdealer market
requires investors who are on the long side of the market to be indi⁄erent between trading and
not trading. It is easy to show that in steady state investors who want to sell are on the short










r+￿+￿ if ￿ < A;
(80)
where ￿ u ￿ ￿1u11 + ￿0u10.35
33DGP state their restriction on asset holdings as a 2 [0;1] but only study equilibria in which agents hold
either 0 or 1 unit of the asset, which is e⁄ectively equivalent to imposing the restriction a 2 f0;1g.
34￿High valuation￿corresponds to the index ￿2￿in our formulation and ￿1￿in DGP.







and the equilibrium price in the interdealer market is indeterminate.
51The asset holding restrictions in DGP are also the reason why the asset price in their theory
is independent of the stock of assets, A, for any A < ￿ and for any A > ￿, with a discontinuity at
A = ￿. In contrast, the asset price in our model is smooth and decreasing in A. For example, in







The behavior of the asset price in response to changes in the trading frictions in DGP depends
critically on the level of A. From (80), p is increasing in ￿ (decreasing in ￿) if A < ￿ but
decreasing in ￿ (increasing in ￿) if A > ￿. In contrast, with unrestricted asset holdings these
extensive-margin considerations are irrelevant to assess the impact of trading frictions on the
asset price (recall Proposition 4).









1￿￿g in DGP. The latter is independent of the dealers￿bargaining power, ￿,
and of all preference parameters and holding payo⁄s (e.g., r, k). In contrast, these parameters
are critical determinants of trade volume in our theory, as they in￿ uence the investors￿choices
of asset holdings (the second factor in V). Our model predicts that markets in which dealers
have less market power will tend exhibit larger trade volume.37
Transaction costs. DGP￿ s transaction costs can be expressed in terms of the intermediation
fees ￿01 and ￿10 that dealers charge investors who want to buy and sell, respectively. The equi-
librium spread is s =
￿(u11￿u10)
r+￿+￿ .38 Conditional on having contacted an investor, the expected





determinant of dealers￿incentives to make markets is decreasing in the investors￿contact rate
with dealers, ￿, and increasing in the dealers￿bargaining power, ￿. In contrast, as we have
shown analytically in Proposition 1, in our model with no restrictions on asset holdings it is
natural for the average fee to be nonmonotonic in ￿ and ￿. Our theory suggests that these
nonmonotonicities can be important. From an applied standpoint, they help explain how OTC
36Notice that we obtain DGP￿ s formulation with A < ￿ as a special case of ours when ￿ ! 0.
37Apart from these qualitative di⁄erences, the theory with unrestricted portfolios also has di⁄erent quantitative
implications for the relationship between trade volume and trading frictions. For example, DGP￿ s model has a
sharp empirical implication: the elasticity of trade volume with respect to trading frictions equals
￿
￿+￿ 2 (0;1).
In contrast, in the model with unrestricted asset holdings the corresponding elasticity is larger by an amount that
equals the elasticity of (a2 ￿ a1) with respect to ￿￿ which is positive, capturing the notion that each investor
wishes to conduct a larger trade when frictions are reduced.
38Since asset holdings in DGP are restricted to lie in f0;1g, every trade is of size 1 and hence ￿01+￿10 = s. In
addition, the indivisibility assumption implies that dealers either charge a fee on asset sales or on asset purchases,
but not both. Speci￿cally, if A < ￿ then ￿01 = 0 and investors only pay a fee ￿10 = s when they sell. Conversely,
if ￿ < A, ￿10 = 0 and investors only pay a fee ￿01 = s when they buy.
52markets have reacted to recent changes in their market structure (see Lagos and Rocheteau,
2006). From a theoretical standpoint, they can generate self-ful￿lling liquidity shortages in
markets with free entry of dealers (Section 6).39
Another key di⁄erence with DGP is the fact that since the equilibrium in the model
with unrestricted portfolios implies a nondegenerate distribution of trade sizes, our theory
has predictions for the relationship between transaction costs and transaction sizes. As we
showed in Lemma 4, transaction costs are increasing in the size of the transaction. Thus, if
ai ￿ aj > ai ￿ ak > 0, then the e⁄ective price at which the investor buys is ^ pji > ^ pki, i.e.,
he e⁄ectively pays higher prices when he conducts larger purchases. Conversely, ^ pji < ^ pki if
ai ￿ aj < ai ￿ ak < 0, i.e., he e⁄ectively receives lower prices when he conducts larger sales. In
other words, the theory with unrestricted asset holdings naturally generates instances of price
concession which are commonplace in OTC markets.40
Execution delays. DGP endogenized trading delays by allowing a single monopolist dealer
to choose search intensity once-and-for-all at the beginning of time. Free entry of competing
dealers or market-makers is a feature of most OTC markets, however, the implications of this
microstructure have not yet been explored in the literature. We ￿nd that allowing for free entry
of dealers is a natural way to endogenize execution delays and the amount of liquidity supplied by
dealers, and that it provides an important channel through which changes in market conditions
a⁄ect transaction costs and trade volume. In addition, the interaction between free entry and
unrestricted asset holdings leads to a natural kind of strategic complementarity that can help
rationalize self-ful￿lling liquidity shortages in markets with OTC-style frictions (Section 6).
Welfare. The equilibrium allocation is always constrained e¢ cient in the baseline model
of DGP￿ regardless of the value of ￿￿ which stands in contrast to the ￿nding we report in
Proposition 2. The reason is that in our model investors choose asset holdings, while this
intensive margin is absent in DGP. For the same reason, the ine¢ ciency result we ￿nd in the
context of the model with free entry also has no counterpart in DGP.
39The spread, s, is decreasing in ￿ and increasing in ￿ in this version of DGP with no inter-investor meetings.
One can also verify that the average e⁄ective spread weighted by the sizes of each trade and expressed as
a proportion of the price is also decreasing in ￿ and increasing in ￿. The behavior of this measure of the
marketwide spread, i.e., (38) in Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) is much more complicated in our model, where the
investors￿expected holding payo⁄s, their individual asset demands, the asset price, and the whole distribution
of asset holdings change in response to a change in ￿. Our numerical work, some of which we have reported in
Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) is in accordance with the predictions of DGP.
40See Section 4.3 in Harris (2003).
53A paper that is closely related to ours is an independent contribution by G￿rleanu (2006),
which studies the asset pricing and volume implications of infrequent (Poisson) trading oppor-
tunities. Some of our ￿ndings are similar: he also ￿nds that under certain conditions (e.g.,
a mean-reversion property of preference shocks) investors take more extreme positions when
trading delays are short. Also, G￿rleanu stresses that the asset price is not a⁄ected by the trad-
ing frictions￿ which is true in our model for a particular speci￿cation of the utility function
(Proposition 4). In terms of di⁄erences, trades in G￿rleanu (2006) are not intermediated by
dealers so he could not consider the implications of execution delays for transaction costs and
dealers￿incentives to provide liquidity, which are at the center of our analysis. Also, G￿rleanu
(2006) formalizes the investors￿motive for holding the asset by developing the ￿hedging needs￿
motive we mentioned in footnote 4. Despite the di⁄erences in the formulations, some of our
results on the e⁄ects of ￿ on trade volume are remarkably similar.41
E.2 Search models of money
Here we discuss the relationship between our theory and the search-theoretic literature on
monetary exchange. In contrast to the monetary literature our model does not have ￿at money
as an asset and it does not aim to explain the use or emergence of a medium of exchange.
However, it shares a common objective with modern monetary theory, which is to endogenize
some relevant dimensions of ￿liquidity.￿ We organize the comparison around four types of
results.
Endogenous distribution of asset holdings. Because of idiosyncratic (trading) shocks,
under incomplete markets, our model generates a nondegenerate distribution of wealth as Green
and Zhou (2002) and Molico (2006), but also Aiyagari (1994). The trading mechanism in our
model is closer to the one in Molico: the asset is traded in bilateral matches and the transaction
price is determined through bargaining. In terms of the methodology, both Aiyagari (1994) and
Molico (2006) solve their models numerically. Green and Zhou (2002) is closer to our analysis in
that they can characterize the equilibrium and its distribution of money holdings analytically.
Moreover, like us, they do not restrict their analysis to stationary equilibria. The pricing
mechanism is di⁄erent (Green and Zhou consider a double auction).
Bargaining and the distribution of prices. A key insight of our model is that the interme-
41See the discussion around Proposition 10 in Appendix B for details.
54diation fee depends on the (endogenous) asset position of the investor. Similarly, in monetary
search models with bargaining, the transaction price depends on the traders￿money balances.
This dependence occurs through (at least) two channels. First, the buyer can be constrained by
his money balances. This mechanism is present even in models with a degenerate distribution of
money balances, such as Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2005). Second, the money holdings
of an agent a⁄ect his marginal utility of wealth, and hence the terms of trade. These two e⁄ects
are absent from our model since our investors never face binding borrowing constraints, and the
marginal utility of wealth is normalized to one due to the quasi-linear preferences. An investor￿ s
asset holdings in￿ uence the outcome of the bargaining in our model because this asset position
determines the size of the gains from trade that will be generated for readjusting the investor￿ s
asset holdings.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium. The equilibrium (not just the steady state) is unique
in our model. In contrast, the model of ￿at money of Green and Zhou can display multiple
equilibria. This indeterminacy is a general feature of models of ￿at money. Even in models with
a degenerate distribution of money balances, e.g., Lagos and Wright (2005), the equilibrium is
typically not unique, unless one restricts attention to steady-state monetary equilibria. Models
of monetary exchange consider environments where the asset being traded is ￿at money, whose
value emerges endogenously when it is valued as a medium of exchange that mitigates a double-
coincidence of wants problem. In contrast, in our model and the rest of the literature that deals
with the trading process in OTC markets, the asset being traded is not used to facilitate trades;
it is valued for its intrinsic characteristics (e.g., dividend ￿ ow).
Endogenous trading delays and multiple equilibria. In our model, the multiplicity of
steady-state equilibria with dealer entry arises from complementarities between investors￿asset
demands and dealers￿entry decision. If more dealers participate in the market, it is easier for
investors to readjust their asset holdings which induces them to take more extreme positions,
and this in turn makes it pro￿table for dealers to enter. Rocheteau and Wright (2005) consider
a monetary search model with free entry of sellers and ￿nd that the strategic complementarities
between the sellers￿entry decision and the buyers￿demand for real balances generates multiple
steady-state equilibria. If buyers accumulate more real balances, the buyer and the seller are
able to exploit larger gains from trade, which gives more incentives for sellers to participate in
the market. In both models, the multiplicity does not require increasing returns to scale in the
55matching function as in Diamond (1982) or as in most recent search models of ￿nancial markets,
e.g., Vayanos and Weill (2007). A key di⁄erence between our model and Rocheteau and Wright
(2005) is the opportunity cost from holding real balances in the latter, which has no counterpart
in our formulation. If the opportunity cost from holding cash balances to make a purchase is
zero (e.g., if the nominal interest rate is zero) then the multiplicity of (active) steady-state
equilibria in that model disappears. In contrast, the multiplicity in our model obtains even
though investors do not bear any opportunity cost (e.g., forgone interest) while searching for
an asset to purchase (since they have access to a technology to produce the numØraire good).
Also, notice that the gains from trade in Rocheteau and Wright (2005) depend on the mean
of the distribution of real balances (since the distribution of real balances is degenerate as in
Lagos and Wright, 2005), which is independent of trading frictions when the nominal interest
rate is zero. In our model it is the second moment, which is endogenous and depends on the
trading frictions, what gives rise to multiple steady-state equilibria.
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